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1. INTRODUCTION
The substantive content of China's Hong Kong policy reveals
stark changes over time between the mid-1980s and the 1990s. In
1984, China and Britain signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration
for the return of Hong Kong to China.' The Joint Declaration,
covering a period of fifty years after 1997, provides for Hong
Kong to become a capitalist Special Administrative Region
("S.A.R.") in China. Under this agreement, there is to be "one
country, two systems" with "Hong Kong people ruling Hong
Kong" and Hong Kong having a "high degree of autonomy."
Written in the early days of China's opening up to the outside
world, this agreement articulates a pragmatic policy that aims to
protect Hong Kong from interference from the mainland, and
provides a policy of democratization, the rule of law, the common
law, and human rights. Nearly a decade later, when the euphoria
over China's opening-up had diminished and the tragedy of
Tiananmen had passed, China's statements on Hong Kong became
less magnanimous. In the 1990s, China has been more likely to
fret that Hong Kong not be made a "base of subversion." In this
more tense atmosphere, China has begun to advocate an econom-
ic, rather than a political, Hong Kong. The idea of Hong Kong's
people ruling Hong Kong has begun to mean China's hand-picked
business elite ruling Hong Kong.
This Article offers a critique of these two competing para-
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I See Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984,
U.K.-P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
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digms for Hong Kong's future, and assesses what they may mean
in practical and contextual terms. The Article first offers an
account of what the Sino-British Joint Declaration requires and
what many in Hong Kong insist upon: a politically and economi-
cally free Hong Kong. The Article then assesses the alternative
"economic Hong Kong" policy and its implications. It concludes
with a plea to restore the Joint Declaration's vision and its
implications for Hong Kong. The Article will focus on Hong
Kong's evolving constitutive process on a conceptual level, rather
than on the level of political dynamics.2
This Article's constitutional economy assessment does not aim
to take Asian neo-authoritarian economic development strategies
as a serious option for present-day Hong Kong, but rather aims to
point out their inapplicability and the likely detrimental effects of
attaching baseless authoritarianism to Hong Kong's continued
economic strategy. The economic developmental model is wrong
for Hong Kong because (1) Hong Kong's success was not built on
this model and there is no credible reason to change course, and
(2) other developed Asian countries have largely abandoned this
model, instead embracing democratization and liberal reform. At
this critical juncture in Hong Kong's history, there is a real danger
that Asian values and developmental rhetoric will be used to mask
policies that are totally inimical to Hong Kong's interest.3
2. THE PROMISE OF A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM
2.1. An Overview of the Theoretical Underpinnings
This Section will highlight the liberal democratic paradigm of
the Hong Kong promise. In evaluating the promises made in the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law,4 this Section employs as the
2 For a recent article that discusses the evolving politics of constitu-
tionalism in Hong Kong, see Michael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: A Framework for Analysis, 34
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1996). This article affords a more elaborate
factual background for the present article.
' This Article will not take seriously any alleged danger that six million
unarmed Hong Kongpeople could overthrow the mainland government,
though the merits of Hong Kong policies and practices should be considered
where appropriate on the mainland.
4 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990 (P.R.C.), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1520
(1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
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basis for comparison the notion of a liberal democratic constitu-
tion. In simple terms, this Section emphasizes the three key
ingredients of such a system: (1) democratic elections with open
multi-party contestation; (2) liberal human rights, including
freedom of expression; and (3) the rule of law, notably judicial
review of legislation under a constitution or basic law. More-
over, these ingredients should be looked at in terms of a construc-
tive understanding of what constitutional democracy does. The
vision here is not merely one of constitutional constraint, but one
of constructing a dynamic venue for contestation. Viewed in this
way, constitutionalism not only limits government, but also
provides a venue for engendering discourse about basic political
commitments and values.'
2.2. The Sino-British Joint Declaration
The Joint Declaration largely conforms to the liberal constitu-
tional paradigm, requiring a degree of democratization, as well as
liberal human rights and the rule of law. The relevant provi-
sions relating to democracy require the legislature to be "constitut-
ed by elections," but allow the future Chief Executive to be
chosen by "elections or through consultations held locally."8 The
idea that the Chief Executive can be chosen by elections or
consultations reflects the key respect in which the Joint Declara-
tion, on its face, falls short of the liberal constitutional ideal.
Otherwise, the provisions for democratization in the Joint
Declaration call for a new development in Hong Kong, as Hong
5 See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 223 (1989).
6 See Michael C. Davis, Democracy, Rights and Relativism 13-14 (Dec. 13,
1996) (unpublished manuscript, University of Hong Kong Conference on
Trends in Contemporary Constitutional Law, on file with author).
z See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3), (5) & annex I S I-ll, XfLI.
Id. para. 3(4) & annex I S II. One school of thought posits that China
was resistant to democratization, even favoring consultation for choosing the
legislature, and that therefore meaningful democratization was not intended in
the Joint Declaration. See Mark Roberti, The Betrayal of a Democratic Dream,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 1997, at 12. I contest this view. There is
little doubt that China is not predisposed toward democratization. But the fact
that this issue was directly discussed and that China opted to embrace election
of the legislature tends to verify that such limited democratization was
knowingly agreed upon and is therefore required by the Joint Declaration.
This was a wise and conscious decision.
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Kong in 1984 was not significantly democratic.9 Moving from no
elections in 1984 to full elections for the legislature in 1997 made
changes inevitable. That the agreement was reached in the face of
public demands and various local official proposals calling for
democratization left little doubt that Hong Kong would need to
take up democratic reform to prepare for its future.1 0
There is little ambiguity as to the appropriateness of the liberal
constitutional paradigm when it comes to human rights and the
rule of law. The Joint Declaration makes clear that there is to be,
as the supreme law of Hong Kong, a written Basic Law. The
Joint Declaration and Annex I are stipulated into its content."
This content includes the formal guarantee of a long list of liberal
rights, nearly half of which relate to freedom of expression in one
form or another. The latter aspect suggests that it was contem-
plated that Hong Kong's vigorous tradition of press and associatio-
nal freedom is to be maintained. There is actually to be an
enhancement of Hong Kong's human rights guarantees, as there
had previously been no written legislative or constitutional
guarantee of basic human rights. Convergence with this anticipat-
ed written rights regime was achieved early in 1991 with the
passage of the Bill of Rights Ordinance12 and the amendments to
the Letters Patent to incorporate the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 3 The Joint Declaration
also explicitly assures that socialism will not be practiced and that
the capitalist system and way of life will remain unchanged for
fifty years. 14
" The exception to this was a system which allowed direct election with
universal suffrage (with some seats filled by appointment) to District Boards,
which had been created about three years earlier, but these bodies were strictly
advisory. See The Districts Look for New Direction, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 10, 1996, at 13.
10 The Hong Kong Government issued both a Green Paper and a White
Paper on Representative Government in 1984. See Hong Kong Government,
The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong
(Green Paper, July 1984); Hong Kong Government, The Further Development
of Representative Government in -fong Kong (White Paper, Nov. 1984).
n See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(12).
12 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Ordinance No. 59 (1991).
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The
Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, issued by the Queen in the United
Kingdom, constitute the current written constitution of colonial Hong Kong.
14 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, annex I § I.
[Vol. 18:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/10
POLITICS VERSUS ECONOMICS
The Joint Declaration also requires the rule of law, including
constitutional judicial review. Not only is the Basic Law to be
supreme, but the existing common law system is to be maintained.
The courts are to be independent and final, and Hong Kong's
people are guaranteed the right to challenge the acts of the
executive in the courts." Furthermore, the Joint Declaration
expressly provides that the laws enacted by the future legislature
are required to be submitted to the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress ("NPC") "for the record." There is
no mention of NPC review, probably because the agreement
envisioned this power to be within the scope of the local courts.
The notions of independence and finality appear not to permit the
local courts to refer matters out for review. Finally, the require-
ment that the ICCPR continue to apply signifies a strong
commitment to legality and the rule of law.
Overall, it is difficult to make any sense of the Joint Declara-
tion, except as a treaty providing for a liberal constitutional
system in Hong Kong. When the Joint Declaration was signed,
the people of Hong Kong, many of whom had escaped commu-
nism in China, were seriously concerned about the prospects of
communist rule. Their continued confidence in the future could
be maintained with nothing less than the strongest assurances.
Chinese officials understood this when they offered the Joint
Declaration as an inducement to "put their hearts at ease." The
internationalization of this guarantee, through an international
treaty, was a measure of the earnestness of China's commitment.
In this regard, extensive provisions allowing Hong Kong to
conduct its own relations in the economic, social, and cultural
spheres enhanced Hong Kong's autonomous self-rule.6 In
making these assurances, Chinese officials openly acknowledged
the general anxiety in Hong Kong. Official awareness was aided
by China's own political trauma on the heels of the Cultural
Revolution. The people of Hong Kong awaited the expected
execution of these guarantees in the Basic Law.
2.3. The Basic Law
Early on in the Basic Law drafting process China took rather
15 See id. para. 3(3) & annex I S I-rT, and VflI.
16 See id. para. 3(9) & annex I SS VI-XI.
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seriously the need to reassure the people of Hong Kong. The
engaging quality of this process, involving a Consultative Commit-
tee of 180 members, all from Hong Kong, and a Drafting
Committee of 59 members from Hong Kong (23 members) and
China (36 members), suggests this much.17 The former hard-line
communist regime's selection of such a large contingent of
capitalists, as well as lawyers and former activists, for these
committees reinforces this impression. This was to be the longest
Basic Law drafting processes in the annuls of constitution-making,
taking some six years. The Joint Declaration, which was
incorporated into the Basic Law, represents a substantial liberal
democratic upstream constraint."8 The drafting process became
a rear-guard action by a few liberal-minded drafters (notably
Martin Lee and Szeto Wah) on the Drafting Committee to
restrain any erosion of these upstream commitments contained in
the Joint Declaration.
Judging the final Basic Law with respect to democracy, there
is some success and some failure. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the
Hong Kong democracy movement, led by Mr. Lee and Mr. Szeto
Wah, pushed for full democracy both under British rule and with
respect to the then ongoing Basic Law drafting process. t9 As
discussed below, this resulted in some democratic reform allowing
for functional electoral constituencies in 1988 and eighteen and
twenty directly elected seats, respectively, in 1991 and 1995, as
well as complex formulas for greater democracy under a 1992
democracy plan.2" During the Basic Law process, China resisted
"' See Frank Ching, Toward Colonial Sunset: The Wilson Regime, 1987-1992,
in PRECARIOUS BALANCE: HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRiTAIN,
1842-1992, 173 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1994) [hereinafter PREcAmIOUS BALANCE].
is See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(12). In his recent article on
constitution-making, Jon Elster uses the notions of "upstream" and "down-
stream" constraints to refer to prior and subsequent limitations imposed on the
constitution drafting body. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the
Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364 (1995). I must thank Victoria
Hui for drawing my attention to the comparative length of this drafting and
pre-implementation process, the time allotted to drafting and preparations for
implementation totalling a dozen years.
9 See Ching, supra note 17, at 173; Ming Sing, The Democracy Movement
in Hong Kong, 1987-1990 (1993) (Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University,
Nuffield College).
20 In 1988 the British Hong Kong Government held an election allowing
for 26 indirectly elected seats out of 57 seats in the Legislative Council. See
PRECARIOUS BALANCE, supra note 17, at 208 (providing a chronology of major
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democratic development, but ultimately, under a last minute deal
struck with the British in 1990, allowed for the graduated system
of democratization now contained in the Basic Law.21 The
erosion here is substantial, as this system (twenty directly elected
seats anticipated for 1997 and twenty-four for 1999) falls far short
of the notion of the legislature being constituted by elections, as
specified in the Joint Declaration. As discussed below, the
electoral provisions were finalized after the Tiananmen tragedy,
when China's resistance to democracy was at its peak and the
British policy of accommodation was still in place.
The Basic Law's human rights guarantees in Chapter HI appear
reasonably adequate on their face. All of the rights listed in the
Joint Declaration are included, as is a provision requiring
implementation of the international human rights covenants. An
earlier, much broader restrictions clause, in what is now Article
39, raised concerns that rights would be severely limited in the
name of some vaguely defined public interest. However, this
language was substantially improved by the final draft in early
1989. The restrictions clause now appears to say that any
restrictions on rights must not violate the specified international
events in the history of Hong Kong). Eighteen directly elected seats were
allowed in 1991, of which pro-democracy candidates won 16. See id. at 212.
For the 1995 Legislative Council elections, 20 seats were allotted for direct
election, with 10 for a broad-based electoral committee and 30 from functional
constituencies, of which 10 were broad-based under Governor Chris Patten's
1992 electoral proposal discussed below. See Governor of Hong Kong
Christopher Patten, Our Next Five Years: The Agenda for Hong Kong,
Address at the Opening of the 1992-93 Session of the Legislative Council (Oct.
7, 1992) (transcript available at the Chinese University of Hong Kong). As
discussed below, a dispute arose when China objected to the democratizing
character of the Patten pro posal, a proposal in which he sought to conform
(and seemingly did conform to an electoral agreement with China regarding
the constituency makeup of the first S.A.R. Legislative Council, which had
originally been anticipated to serve from 1995 through 1997 to 1999.
21 The Basic Law provides for progressive democratization with respect to
the Legislative Council as follows: 1999, 24 directly elected, 6 chosen by an
Election Committee, and 30 by functional constituencies; 2003, 30 by direct
election and 30 by functional constituencies. See Basic Law, supra note 4,
annexes I-1. Throughout this period the Chief Executive is to be chosen by
an Election Committee, whose 800 members are chosen largely by functional
sectors. See id. annex I. The Basic Law declares the ultimate goal to be full
universal suffrage. See id. arts. 45, 68. In this respect the Basic Law allows for
amendment of the electoral structure in 2007 if endorsed by two-thirds of the
Legislative Council and the Chief Executive and approved by the NPC
Standing Committee. See id. annexes I-.
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covenants, thereby incorporating them by reference. The largest
substantive threat to rights is embodied in two provisions in
Chapter II added or enhanced after Tiananmen: The first
provides an opportunity for the NPC Standing Committee, in
case it judges that there is "turmoil" in the region, to declare the
application of the "relevant" national laws;" the second requires
the local S.A.R. government to enact laws to prevent acts of
"treason, secession, sedition, subversion ... or theft of state
secrets" and to prevent foreign political organizations from
operating in the region or having ties with local political organiza-
tions.23
As is generally the case with rights guarantees, their ultimate
force depends on enforcement in the courts. The question of
constitutional judicial review is therefore of key importance. In
this regard, the degree of erosion of the Joint Declaration's
commitment is considerable, though the Basic Law should be
interpreted as granting substantial power of constitutional judicial
review to the local courts. While Article 158 vests the power of
interpreting the Basic Law in the Standing Committee of the
NPC, it also authorizes the local courts to interpret the Basic Law
"on their own, in adjudicating cases" for issues that fall "within
the limits of the autonomy of the Region."24 The courts are to
refer "affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's
Government, or concerning the relationship between the Central
Authorities and the Region" to the Standing Committee of the
NPC, which is in turn to be advised by a Committee for the Basic
Law,' Article 17 provides that, when laws are enacted, the
Standing Committee, after consulting the Committee for the Basic
Law, if it considers any law to fail to conform with the Basic Law
"regarding affairs within the responsibility of the Central
Authorities or regarding the relationship between the Central
Authorities and the region," may invalidate them.26 A certain
symmetry implies that the courts should do the same if a law is
2 See id. art. 18.
" See id. art. 23.
24 See id. art. 158.
21 See id.
26 See id. art. 17.
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challenged and is within the scope of autonomy.'
Having the Standing Committee interpret and review laws
appears to violate the Joint Declaration's specific provisions
requiring maintenance of the common law and specifying that
laws be submitted to the Standing Committee "for the record."
Having the courts refer matters to the Standing Committee for
interpretation also violates the Joint Declaration's requirements of
independence and finality. During the drafting phase, Chinese
officials stated that the Standing Committee would rarely exercise
powers of review, but is this promise of non-interference reliable?
The courts of Hong Kong should understand that they have the
power of constitutional judicial review under the Basic Law, and
they should exercise that power. Any exceptions should be
construed very narrowly.28 Overall, the Basic Law allows for an
interpretation that preserves human rights and the rule of law.
But if the interpretation of the rights provisions themselves or of
words like "turmoil," "subversion," and "political organizations"
is left to mainland officials or their supporters in Hong Kong,
there is reason for concern. It is therefore imperative that
legislators, executive officials, and judges not be intimidated in
carrying out their duties under the Basic Law.
Recognizing that the Basic Law was troubled by considerable
ambiguity and cross-purposes in interpretation, in 1991 the Hong
Kong British Government enacted a Bill of Rights and amended
the current constitution, the Letters Patent, to incorporate the
ICCPR. It is noteworthy that these reforms created considerable
opportunity for the Hong Kong courts to gain experience with
judicial review under a written bill of rights. If this jurispruden-
tial experience is left in place and allowed to continue in the
future, considerable hope exists for Hong Kong to live up to
international human rights standards.' Basic Law provisions
' Note further that Article 19 of the Basic Law restricts the courts' juris-
diction over acts of state. This may be a very broad exception or simply
roughly parallel to the political question doctrine in the United States. Further
concern arises out of the Standing Committee's power under Article 160 to
review all laws upon the transfer of sovereignty.
28 I propose that judges suggest opinions to the Standing Committee,
thereby insuring the drafting integrity of legal opinions.
29 See Michael C. Davis, Adopting International Standards ofHuman Rights
in Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPH-
ICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 168 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES].
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respecting democratization, on the other hand, simply fail to meet
the requirements of the Joint Declaration and should be amended
accordingly. The struggle for Hong Kong is essentially taking
place within the venue, sometimes a battlefield, constructed by
these documents.
3. THE STRUGGLE FOR HONG KONG
3.1. The Struggle: An Overview
Both the promises of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and
the reality of present-day Hong Kong reveal the potential it has
to be a vibrant emerging constitutional democracy, that is both
politically and economically free. It is this freedom which is at
stake in the fight for Hong Kong. This Section considers how the
above-noted foundational requirements are reflected in the
emerging reality. This emerging reality may be organized around
three contextual stages: (1) Hong Kong before the 1991-92
reforms, (2) Hong Kong after such reforms, and (3) China's
transition policies and practices. It must be kept in mind that the
constitutional documents alone do not create a political transition.
It is the combination of the above constitutive founding processes
and actual practice that will comprise the post-1997 Hong Kong.
This Section focuses on those factual developments which bear
directly on the constitutive process. The last of the three phases
discussed in this Section, China's transition policies, will serve as
a transition topic to the next Section, which introduces China's
likely alternative paradigm, economic Hong Kong. If such a
paradigm is taking shape, it reflects a considerable tension with
the liberal democratic promises in the Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion and Hong Kong's current state of development. After 1989,
this tension began to appear in the substance of the numerous
Sino-British disputes.30
30 The tragic developments surrounding the 1989 Democracy Movement
in China had a tremendous impact on China's policy toward Hong Kong and
on the Hong Kong people's anxiety over their fiture. These issues, as discussed
in the companion article noted above, produced or strongly effected the
institutional developments that took shape in 1991 and 1992. See Davis, supra
note 2, at 307-11. These policy shifts and public anxieties likewise remain as
a force on the eve of the transition.
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3.2. Hong Kong Prior to 1991
Although China signed the Joint Declaration in 1984, agreeing
that the people of Hong Kong would rule Hong Kong under a
regime of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, no
constitutional guarantee of basic human rights was achieved until
1991. Prior to 1991, Hong Kong had a colonial authoritarian
regime that languished between constitutive paradigms. Its
constitutional personnel under the Letters Patent and Royal
Instructions most significantly included an appointed British
Governor, who on paper had largely unlimited powers as
determined in London; appointed Legislative and Executive
Councils, made up largely of select elites, especially business elites
and high officials; a fairly autonomous career civil service; and an
independent judiciary." The constitutional order reflected a
fairly simple colonial authoritarian structure, but one with
substantial common law protection of rights, freedom, and the
rule of law. On paper, however, such protection was not evident.
There was no formal bill of rights, nor any other written
constitutional guarantees of rights (this despite the fact that the
United Kingdom had acceded to the ICCPR on behalf of Hong
Kong). Constitutional judicial review was conceptually allowed,
given the local subordination of laws to acts of the British
Parliament and to the constitutional documents, but had not been
significantly practiced in the absence of a formal bill of rights.
During most of the years of colonial rule, the system was highly
discriminatory in practice, a preserve of British privilege. 2  In
addition, many of the laws on secrecy, corruption, emergencies,
association, and matters of security afforded draconian powers,
though such powers were rarely exercised to the full extent.33
Nevertheless, the common law tradition practiced in Hong
31 There were some elected members of the Legislative Council from so-
called functional constituencies and local boards in 1988, but this ingredient was
essentially elite-based as well, since most of the functional constituencies were
business and professional groups. See generally NORMAN MINERS, TI
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 63-75 (3d ed. 1984).
32 See Peter Wesley-Smith, Anti-Chinese Legislation in Hong Kong, in
PRECARIOUS BALANCE, supra note 17, at 91.
11 See MICHAEL C. DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN HONG
KONG, ISSUES AND IMPUCATIONS OF THE BASIC LAw 90-113 (1990)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION].
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Kong came to provide a reliable level of legality and the rule of
law. British common law practices also provided limited
protection of many basic rights and allowed for a reasonably.
vigorous free press. In the post-war period, with slowly decreas-
ing levels of official discrimination against the Chinese populace
and increased public accountability, this regime began to take on
other liberal components of openness and social equality. The
government in recent decades was also known for a considerable
degree of restraint. The kind of harsh authoritarian practices
evident elsewhere in the region were less visible in Hong Kong.
A free press and the rule of law have been matters of fundamental
importance to Hong Kong's success. 4
On the economic front, Hong Kong's early development
model also seems to have been positioned between paradigms,
conforming in some ways to the Asian capitalist development
model and in other ways being distinct. Some argue that it was
characterized by a laissez-faire approach with minimum govern-
ment interference.35 There is considerable truth in this, but it is
an exaggeration to say that Hong Kong relied only on laissez-faire
policies. Hong Kong, unlike Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and South
Korea, has not carried out a program of micro-incentives for
business activities. 6 It has, however, maintained a policy of
nurturing business through macro-incentives, such as government
appointments to advisory bodies, and general support of structural
and fiscal policies that are favorable to export-led growth. These
policies have included a low tax policy, labor importation policies
that assure a cheap labor force, labor regulation policies that
discourage labor activism, minimalist laws on worker safety, huge
housing and medical services subsidization that make low wages
possible, minimum regulation of business in general, and mini-
mum social welfare for the unemployed." At the same time, the
entrepreneurial initiative arose from the private sector and not the
government. Success at economic development eventually led
Hong Kong to shift to services and finance, while production
14 See generally Davis, supra note 29, at 168-84; STEPHEN CHIU, THE
POLITICS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE: HONG KONG'S STRATEGY OF INDUSTRIALIZA-
TION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (1994).
" See, e.g., CHIU, supra note 34.
36 See id.
37 See id.
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shifted to Southern China, where similar policies on labor and
social welfare further facilitated Hong Kong-controlled export-led
growth.
3.3. Post-1991 Hong Kong
The first direct elections to the Legislative Council, the passage
of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, and the amendments to the
Letters Patent to incorporate the ICCPR, all in 1991, marked a
dramatic change in Hong Kong's constitutional mix. The system
of elite advisory colonial government and minimalist rights
protection gave way to an emergent democracy and an entrenched
bill of rights. As of the 1995 elections, all of the Legislative
Council is elected, though only a third of these seats are gained by
direct election through universal suffrage. Although functional
constituencies for half of the seats insure substantial representation
for conservative business interests, various grass-roots democratic
forces hold half of the seats in the chamber.38 As a further
liberalization, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance was passed
in 1991, allowing for direct judicial enforcement of numerous
rights; the language of this ordinance is taken largely verbatim
from the ICCPR.s9 At the same time, the Letters Patent was
amended to incorporate the ICCPR by reference, thereby
establishing a full-blown system of constitutional judicial review
under an entrenched Bill of Rights. The use of the ICCPR in
both cases was aimed to match the requirements of both the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law, both of which require enforce-
ment of the ICCPR.'
The political movement for an increased pace of democratiza-
tion started in the mid-1980s with the push by democratic
activists, led by Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, for direct elections in
1988. 4" As discussed earlier, the Sino-British Joint Declaration
had presaged a need for Hong Kong to develop its own political
" See Jubilant Democrats Eye Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 7,
1995, at 1; Democrats Dominate Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 19,
1995, at 1.
31 See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Ordinance No. 59 (1991).
' See Davis, supra note 29, at 168-84.
41 This movement was lead by the Joint Committee on the Promotion of
Democratic Government, formed in 1986, which was the precursor of the
United Democrats of Hong Kong (later the Democratic Party) that won most
of the seats in the 1991 first direct election. See Sing, supra note 19.
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institutions if Hong Kong was to have self-rule by 1997. Yet in
the late 1980s, the British Hong Kong Government was dragging
its heels over this issue as the British foreign policy team pursued
a policy of appeasement with China and convergence with China's
post-1997 plans, which emerged in the Basic Law then being
drafted. After the tragedy on June 4, 1989, in Tiananmen Square,
Britain and the British Hong Kong Government developed a
greater sense of urgency, proposing both the first direct democrat-
ic elections to the Legislative Council for the 1991 elections and
the enactment of the Bill of Rights.42 At the same time China
became more resistant, vociferously attacking proposed democratic
reforms, the bill of rights proposal, a concurrently proposed plan
to build a new airport, and the British Nationality Act.43
Under these conditions, on the eve of concluding the drafting
of the final Basic Law, a Sino-British secret deal was struck
allowing for eighteen directly elected seats in 1991, with a cap of
twenty for 1997. The remaining seats in the sixty-seat legislature
for the 1997 transition were to be made up of thirty from
functional constituencies (ten new ones added to the existing
twenty) and ten to be chosen by a election committee. 4  As
China continued to drag its heels on the airport and other points
of contention, the British changed their negotiating team,
replacing Governor David Wilson with Chris Patten. A storm
erupted in 1992 when Patten presented his plan for the 1995
elections, conforming to the 1997 requirements noted above but
calling for the ten new functional constituencies to include the
entire working population in the territory; and for the ten
election committee seats to be based on the choices of directly
42 There was also a proposal for construction of a new airport and, in
Britain, a British Nationality Act allowing full British passports for fifty
thousand Hong Kong residents and their families. See PRECARIOUS BALANCE,
supra note 17, at 209-14 (providing a chronology of the history of Hong Kong).
4' The British Nationality Act allowed 50,000 Hong Kong heads-of-
household to gain full British nationality without actually residing in Britain.
See Michael C. Davis, To Go or Not to Go, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 18, 1991,
at 20.
" See Basic Law, supra note 4, annex I; Chris Yeung et al., Secret Deal on
Pace of Reform, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 1990, at 1. Note that
functional constituencies are a form of constituency developed initially by the
British Hong Kong government for the 1988 election, whereby people from
various functional sectors of the economy (for example lawyers, accountants,
etc.) elect representatives to the Legislative Council.
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elected district and regional boards.4' After a diplomatic storm
and seventeen rounds of negotiations, Britain went forward with
its separate plans, as did China.46 The electoral results of both
the 1991 and the 1995 Legislative Council Elections, as well as of
the District Board and Regional Council elections, heavily favored
liberal democratic forces.47 The climate of these developments
has also favored higher levels of public welfare and regulatory
protection, though these are still relatively low by the standards
of developed economies.
The end result of the above developments is that on the eve
of the transition, Hong Kong, with the exception of the appointed
Governor, has key elements of a constitutional democracy: an
elected (though not fully by direct election) legislature, an
entrenched Bill of Rights with substantial press freedom, and a
system of constitutional judicial review for rights enforcement.
At the same time, due to the numerous developments, there is
greater public awareness of political issues. A substantial civil
society has developed, with greater capability for self-government.
These social developments are also reflected in institutional and
political changes, including, most prominently, more civic
education in the schools, expanded levels of academic publication
on local political and legal issues, dramatic expansion of tertiary
education, the development of several political parties, the
formation of several new civic and human rights groups, expan-
sion of the arts and of artistic commentary on public affairs, more
aggressive media coverage of public affairs, and increased transla-
tion of laws and public announcements into Chinese. At the same
time, with respect to implementation of the Bill of Rights,
concerns that judicial enforcement of rights would be at the
expense of law and order were largely dispelled, as the courts took
a very conservative approach to their role.4" In the face of these
41 See PRECARIOUS BALANCE, supra note 17, at 210-14 (providing a
chronology of the history of Hong Kong).
46 See REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG (1994) (presenting
the British account of the negotiations); UK Accused of Breachin& Confidential
Details, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1994, at 12-13 (containing China's
report on the breakdown of the negotiations).
17 See Jubilant Democrats Eye Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 7,
1995, at 1; Democrats Dominate Legco, supra note 38, at 1.
41 A 1995 study of the 247 cases that raised the Bill of Rights, addressing
the period from its enactment in June 1991 until December 1995, revealed the
following: of the challenges, 73 were successful, 129 rejected the claim, 19
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democratically spirited institutional developments, mainland
Chinese policies on Hong Kong have come to reflect a degree of
official anxiety over China's ability to control future develop-
ments.
3.4. China's Transition Policies
On the Chinese side, the transition began in the mid-1980s
with the Basic Law drafting process. In the Joint Declaration, the
notions of "one country two systems," a "high degree of
autonomy," and "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" aimed
to protect Hong Kong from being swamped by the mainland
communist system. The people of Hong Kong were encouraged
to "put their hearts at ease."4' Though some cracks began to
appear early on, this general attitude seemed to pervade the early
Basic Law drafting process. Though early drafts revealed a
mainland effort at containment, evidence shows that liberal
minded drafters succeeded in pushing the drafting body to shore
up several key guarantees, again with democracy being the most
substantial exception. 0 This was the state of affairs up until the
final Basic Law draft in February 1989. The provisions discussed
above, ambiguously allowing for judicial review and rights
protection under the international covenants, were already in
place, while several conservative electoral models were under
consideration.51
The events of mid-1989, when up to a million people marched
on the streets of Hong Kong in support of the democracy
movement in China, produced a fundamental shift in China's
raised the issue but did not decide it, and 26 still had an unknown outcome;
only 55 legal provisions were found to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights
and 43 of these were repealed, while 84 provisions were found consistent; 74%
of all challenges were in criminal cases; after an initial flurry of challenges,
there were about 50 per year. See Johannes Chan, The Hong Kong Bill ofRights
1991-1995: A Statistical Overview, in HONG KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: TWO
YEARS BEFORE 1997, 7-8, 38-76 (ohannes Chan & George Edwards eds., 1995).
'9 See James T.H. Tang & Frank Ching, The MacLehose-Youde Years:
Balancing the "Three-Legged Stool," 1971-86, in PRECARIOUS BALANCE, supra
note 17, at 149, 155.
so See MARTIN LEE & SZETO WAl, THE BASIC LAW, SOME BASIC FLAWS
(1988); BASIC LAW, BASIC QUESTIONS (William McGurn ed., 1988).
"' See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China (Draft, Feb. 1989), reprinted in CoNSTrUTIoN-
AL CONFRONTATION, supra note 33, at 173-215 app. II.
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Hong Kong policy. It was at this point that China more clearly
began to promote the idea of an economic, not political, Hong
Kong. China's policy also appeared to shift from protecting Hong
Kong from China's socialist system to protecting China from
Hong Kong. In this process, the idea of "one country" gained
prominence over "two systems." Hong Kong was not to be a
"base of subversion," and Chinese leaders asserted that "the well
water does not interfere with the river water."5 2 When the post-
June 4th, 1989, Basic Law drafting process, earlier suspended, was
resumed, a conservative model on the pace of democratization was
adopted. 3 This was partly the product of the last-minute secret
deal with the British over the pace of democratization, both
before and after 1997 (aiming at convergence), s  The British
policy at the time this deal was struck was largely one of
appeasement,5 a policy about which Britain would soon become
disillusioned. After the Tiananmen tragedy, harsh provisions
respecting subversion, mainland interference in public security,
and foreign political involvement were added to the final Basic
Law in April 1990.6
When Hong Kong passed its current Bill of Rights in 1991,
and in 1992, Patten put forth his democratization proposals for
the final years of British rule, the Chinese position hardened even
further. After seventeen rounds of negotiations over these
electoral proposals, the notion of convergence was abandoned and
both sides decided to go it alone in implementing their preferred
policies.58 As noted above, Patten's policies were actually carried
52 See PRECARious BALANCE, supra note 17, at 208-210 (providing a
chronology of the history of Hong Kong).
11 See Basic Law, supra note 4, annexes I-Il.
14 See Yeung, supra note 44, at 1.
" The British foreign policy view, as articulated by its government's
leading adviser at the time, Sir Percy Cradock, was that Britain must inevitably
give in to China's demands. See Sir Percy Cradock, Argument Does Not Hold
Waer, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 30, 1996, at 27; Sir Percy Cradock, A
Time for Realism, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 21, 1996, at 10.
5 See Basic Law, supra note 4, arts. 18, 23, & annex I.
SSee Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Ordinance No. 59 (1991); see
also REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG (1994) (presenting the
British account of the negotiations); UK Accused of Breaching Con/intial
Details, supra note 46, at 12-13 (containing China's report on the breakdown
of the negotiations).
58 See id. The NPC later formally abandoned convergence. See Chris
Yeung & Linda Choy, NPC Votes to End HK Political Structure, S. CHINA
19971
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
out in elections at various levels (again largely dominated by the
democratic camp) in 1994 and 1995. China vowed to throw out
the current elected legislature.59 In late 1996, China carried out
this vow, employing an appointed Selection Committee to select
an appointed Provisional Legislature.' Though the legality of
this body is in question, China has determined that it can pass
legislation even before the handover.6 '
China's practices in this late transition period reveal a clear
pattern of rewarding loyal supporters and excluding those who
support democracy or otherwise challenge China's policies, which
seem to be aimed at insuring Beijing's control over developments
after 1997. When the 1993 negotiations over elections broke
down, China set about constructing its so-called "second stove,"
including appointing various Hong Kong and district affairs
advisers; setting up, in 1994, a Preliminary Working Committee
("PWC") as a vehicle for Chinese policy initiatives; and, as called
for in the earlier NPC legislation enacted along with the Basic
Law at the end of 1995, replacing the PWC with the Preparatory
Committee ("PC"). In November 1996, the PC chose a 400-
member Selection Committee, which, in December 1996, chose
the future Chief Executive and a Provisional Legislature." All
of these committees and advisory bodies have been loaded with
members of the business elite and pro-China supporters, to the
MORNING POST, Sept. 4, 1994, at 1.
'9 See Yeung & Choy, supra note 58, at 1.
60 See Clarence Tsui & Louis Won, 'Darkest Hour'for Democracy, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 22, 1996 (special section), at 1; Incumbents and Legco
Losers Win Selection Fight, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1
(highlighting that many of the appointees are people who lost the previous
electionl); Martin Lee, The Wrong Message from China, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 13, 1997, at 19.
6 See Chris Yeung, Tung Vows to Work Towards NPC Decision, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 20, 1996, at 4; Handover Body Will Pass Laws, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 1997, at 4; Linda Choy & No Kwai-Yan, Tung in
Talks Pledge as Laws Voted Down, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at
1. It appears that the body could not be made legal by NPC action as it
violates the Joint Declaration provision that the legislature be chosen by
elections. See Lee, supra note 60, at 19.
62 See Chris Yeung, The Obligations of Office, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 14, 1996, at 21; Incumbents and Legco Losers Win Selection Fight, supra note
60, at 1; Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Tung Leads the Way, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 12, 1996, at 1.
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exclusion of democrats.' The first S.A.R. members of the
Executive Council are also from the so-called pro-China camp."
The pro-China leanings of the future Chief Executive, the Execu-
tive Council, and the Provisional Legislature will insure strong
support for China's transition policies in the first S.A.R. govern-
ment. The heavy representation of the business sectors is
indicative of China's efforts to control politics and emphasize
Hong Kong's economic role. Beyond the politics of this situation,
it is important to emphasize that the appointed Provisional
Legislature clearly fails to conform legally with either the Joint
Declaration or the Basic Law.6"
The other area where recent Chinese policy has been of
concern has been the legal system. This includes most prominent-
63 While the advisory bodies were made up of local Hong Kong residents,
the PWC and the PC were made up of both local and mainland members, in
some respects mimicking the structure of the Basic Law consultative and
drafting committees of the 1980s. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: REVIEW OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1993 392-93 (1994). The powerful
PC has also been rather secretive, adhering to rules of confidentiality and
collective responsibility regarding its proceedings. See Linda Choy & Fung
Wai-Kong, Race for Chief Executive Down to Eight Runners, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at 1, 4-5; Chris Yeung & No Kwai-Yan, Rules
to 'Avoid Confusion,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at 1.
6 The Chief Executive Designate has recently chosen the members for his
first Executive Council, the body of advisors to the Chief Executive; again,
appointees are made up of business elite and pro-China figures. See Chris
Yeung, Tung Reveals His Top Team, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 1997,
at 1. In a concession to Hong Kong sensibilities, the Chief Executive Designate
has allowed all of the existing policy secretaries in the civil service to continue
in their existing positions. See Chris Yeung, Tung Opts for Continuity with
Through.Train Team, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at 1-2. An
added problem is that the PC has taken it upon itself to pass the first electoral
laws for the first S.A.R.-elected legislature which will replace the Provisional
Legislature. See No Kwai-Yan, Preparatory Body Has Last Word on Voting, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at 6. It is expected that, in addition to
the required functional constituencies, such electoral law will embody
proportional representation and/or multi-seat districting so as to dilute the
status of the Democratic Party in any future elections, reducing them to an
opposition role. See Fung Wai-kong, Pro-China Party Leader Calls for
Proportional Representation, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1.
65 The Bar Association has been particularly emphatic about this illegality.
See Barristers Ready to Defy Lu over Provisional Legco, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Apr. 13, 1996, at 1. One of China's own appointees even voted against
the provisional legislature. See Catherine Ng et al., Final Verdict on Legco:
ChinaRetaliates After Wo' Vote on 'Black Day for Democracy', S. CHINA MORN-
ING POST, Mar. 25, 1996, at 1.
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ly the attack on the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and other rights
protections, initially orchestrated through the PWC. The Chinese
government threatened to set aside the Bill of Rights Ordinance
when it was originally passed in 1991.6 This idea was resurrect-
ed in late 1995 in the PWC in a more moderate form as a part of
a process of reviewing Hong Kong's laws for conformity to the
Basic Law. Rather than setting aside the entire Bill of Rights
Ordinance, the PWC sought to emasculate it by recommending
that the implementing provisions be stricken, arguing that they
violated the Basic Law. At the same time, they recommended
reversing human rights reforms in other legislation, and renewing
six draconian colonial laws restricting freedom of expression,
press, and assembly.67 The Hong Kong Legislative Council and
the Bar Association strongly defended the Bill of Rights and other
law reforms from this onslaught. 6' The Preparatory Committee
("PC"), set up in 1996, largely adopted the PWC recommenda-
tions, voting to repeal parts or all of some twenty-five laws as
violative of the Basic Law. 9 Essentially, they voted to set aside
the democratic and human rights law reforms instituted in recent
years. No convincing case has been made that these laws actually
violate the Basic Law.
In addition to attacking the Bill of Rights, China also indicated
that it would not carry out the reporting requirements under the
ICCPR, though it appears bound to do so under the Joint
66 See Davis, supra note 29, at 175.
67 See Connie Law & Chris Yeung, PWC Asks China to Bury Bill of Rights,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 1995, at 1.
68 The Legislative Council passed a condemning resolution by a substantial
majority. See Chris Yeung & No Kwai-Yan, Legco No to China Assault on
Rights, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 16, 1995, at 1; see also The Hong Kong
Bar Association s Views on the Status and Effect of the Bill of Rights Ordinance
(Cap. 383), reprinted in HONG KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: Two YEARS BEFORE
1997, supra note 48, at 187.
69 In addition to striking the operative provisions of the Bill of Rights
Ordinance, the most prominent revisions are the striking of the existing
electoral laws put through by Governor Chris Patten and the recently reformed
Societies Ordinance andPublic Order Ordinance. See Choy & Kwai-Yan, supra
note 61, at 1. Instead of restoring the draconian colonial laws, the PC simply
charged the Provisional Legislature with enacting new laws to replace offending
sections. These PC recommendations were later formally endorsed by the
Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress. See Chris Yeung,
NPC Approves by Overwhelming Majority Resolution to Abolish or Amend
Teritory's Legislation, China Ignores UK to Change Laws, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at 1.
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Declaration.70 A further cause for public human rights concern
lurks in the proposition that the non-elected Provisional Legisla-
ture will be charged with enacting not only new versions of the
aforementioned laws, but also new laws against subversion and
sedition, the latter as required under Article 23 of the Basic
Law.7 ' Finally, the recent admonition from the Chief Executive
designate, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, that the people of Hong Kong
should not think of rights, but of duties, does not bode well for
the future of rights protection in Hong Kong.72
At the same time that the PWC and PC sought to undermine
the Bill of Rights and other legislation by carrying out its own
system of review for conformity to the Basic Law, leading
Chinese officials took up a frontal attack on constitutional judicial
review. They sought to highlight that then Chief Justice of Hong
Kong, Sir Ti Liang Yang, had alleged in private conversation that
the provisions allowing for judicial review under the Bill of Rights
had undermined Hong Kong's legal system.7 3 After his conversa-
tion was exposed, in November of 1995, the Chief Justice (later
Chief Executive candidate) argued in a formal submission to the
government that the Bill of Rights was a threat to Hong Kong's
legal system, in that judges carrying out the judicial review
function to overturn laws were allegedly performing a legislative
function. 4 Both China's views and the views of the former
Chief Justice and his colleagues on the Court of Appeals have
70 See David Wallen, UN Ponders Options on Rights, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at 1.
7 See Martin Lee, A Threat to Our Rights, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.
6, 1996, at 17.
' See Chris Yeung, Tung in a Legal Tangle, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan.
25, 1997, at 17.
7' See No Kwai-Yan, PWC Doubts Remain, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 28, 1995, at 2; Chris Yeung, The War over Sir Ti Liang's Words, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at 17.
74 Yang actually had leaked his views to Chinese officials over dinner, and
when they reported this indiscretion, a scandal ensued in which Yang
ultimately raised further concerns about judicial independence by filing a report
on his views with the executive branch of the Hong Kong government. See
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: REVIEW OF THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, 1995 (1996) (report on Hong Kong); The Statement, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at 6; see also May Sin-Mi Hon, Sir Ti Liang
Calls for 'Truth' over Rights Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 14, 1996, at
4.
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caused concern over the future of human rights and constitutional
judicial review."5 The further fact that by virtue of a Sino-British
deal, the new Court of Final Appeal will not be established until
the date of the handover (with S.A.R. appointees being reported
to the Standing Committee of the NPC "for the record") raises
considerable concern over the future of the rule of law.7'
The above developments reflect a hardening of China's
attempts to control Hong Kong at the very time when Hong
Kong is undergoing a rather successful process of democratization.
The notion of a politically inert and economically dynamic Hong
Kong also began to take shape in China's policy pronouncements.
In May 1994, China's chief policy spokesman on Hong Kong and
Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Mr. Lu
Ping, warned against attempts to turn Hong Kong into a "political
city."'" In 1995, early drafts of China's Ninth Five-Year Plan
(1996-2000) spoke of an independent economic partnership, while
referring to the political relationship as that "between a parent and
a child.""8 By 1996, Chinese officials were instructing Hong
Kong on the limits of its free speech and press, at various times
reportedly indicating taboo expression to include memorial
marches to commemorate the tragic loss of life at Tiananmen
Square on June 4, 1989;71 any personal attacks on Chinese leaders
75 Other members of the court have expressed similar reservations, raising
considerable concern over whether the court will take its duties to defend
human rights seriously after 1997. The Chair of the Local Judges Association,
a member of the Court of Appeals, issued a statement attacking the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance on Nov. 16, 1995. See Benjamin Liu, The Past, the
Present, anzd the Future of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, in HONG
KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: Two YEARS BEFORE 1997, supra note 48, at 183; see
also Connie Law, Top Judge Condemns Rights Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 14, 1995, at 2; Margaret Ng, Tbese Men Must Guard Our Liberty, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 31, 1996, at 21.
76 This concern over judicial appointments has been heightened by the
failure of Chinese officials to agree to the continued service of members of the
body charged with the selection of judges, the Judicial Service Commission. See
Gren Manuel, Through Train Hopefor Judicial Body Fades, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 1, 1997, at 1. If this problem persists, the hope for a strong human
rights commitment by the highest court will fade.
' See Linda Choy, Lu Warns Against Meddling, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
May 7, 1994, at 1.
"' See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Economy to Remain Separate After '97, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 8, 1995, at 1.
"9 See Chris Yeung, Britain to Take Action on Qian's June 4 Ban, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 1996, at 1 (stating that China's Vice-Premier, Qian
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and any "rumors and lies";8  demonstrations against the Chinese
government; and articles in the press advocating Taiwan indepen-
dence, with little clear indication about when comment becomes
advocacy.81 China's Chief Executive designate, Mr. Tung Chee
Hwa, has added vision to this policy by warning against "interna-
tional forces" using Hong Kong in a campaign to isolate China.
2
In his political platform, he emphasizes looking to consensus
rather than confrontation, the importance of Chinese values, and
that people should "talk more about our duties rather than our
rights."8"
A disturbing aspect of China's emerging position is official
ambivalence about the importance of the rule of law and human
rights in contributing to Hong Kong's success. While the 1984
Joint Declaration, issued at a time when China was initiating its
own reforms, showed a healthy appreciation for Hong Kong's
success formula, recent statements and propaganda suggest a
revision of this view. China's President, Jiang Zemin, is reported
to have disagreed that Hong Kong's success be attributed, either
wholly or in part, to its independent judiciary and rule of law; he
stressed that it was creativity and China that created Hong
Qichen, announced the prohibition of these marches).
" See Chris Yeung, Contradictions Cast a Shadow, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 19, 1996, at 19.
" The latter points were announced in Japan by the Director of China's
Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, Lu Ping. See Chris Yeung, Anger as
Qian Bans June 4 Protests, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 17, 1996, at 1; Chris
Yeung, Anti-Beijing Protests to Be Banned, Says Lu Ping, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 5, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Lu Clarifies Position on Press Freedom,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 6, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Lu Sets Out
Ground-rules for Press Freedom After 1996, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 1,
1996, at 1.
2 See Chris Yeung, Anti-China 'Forces' Out to Use HK, Warns Tung, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Tung on Brink of
Victory, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 16, 1996, at 1. Tung has further
attacked the Democrat's leader for "badmouthing" Hong Kong overseas. See
Tung Blasts 'Bad Mouth' Lee, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 14, 1997, at 1.
" See Fung Wai-Kong & Linda Chory, Tung Stresses Consensus, Not
Confrontation, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung,
Tung Wants Focus on Daily Life, Not Politics, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
28, 1996, at 4; Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Tung Manifesto Preaches Chinese
Cultural Virtues, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at 4; see also Hong
Kong's Freedoms Imperiled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at A28.
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Kong.14 The barrage of mainland media propaganda preparing
the nation for China's recovery-of Hong Kong also paints a grim
picture of British rule."5 While the communist regime has
always spared no praise for colonialism, the kind of grudging
respect for British Hong Kong's success evident in the Joint
Declaration is now, at the critical transition moment, little in
evidence. These policy perspectives and statements raise questions
as to what kind of structural vision Chinese political leaders
harbor for Hong Kong.
4. THE NEO-AUTHORITARIAN ECONOMIC MODEL
4.1. Contrasting Paradigms
It is apparent that there are contrasting paradigms in the
present Chinese policy calling for an economic Hong Kong and
the liberal vision evident in the Joint Declaration and current
Hong Kong practice. It is worthwhile to speculate as to the
specific conceptual content of China's current paradigm, in order
to evaluate its soundness in terms of overriding goals. China
appears to be promoting in Hong Kong a form of economic
liberalism with quasi-authoritarian political control, which is a
vision quite different from that promised in the Joint Declaration
and demanded by democratic forces in Hong Kong.
No particular plan has been put forward as to what an
economic Hong Kong means. There are only indications, evident
in the above noted events and statements, that there will be less
democracy, less emphasis on rights, and more emphasis on
economic success. These indications were seen initially in China's
reaction to the developments in Hong Kong surrounding the 1989
democracy movement in China, and in China's reaction to
Patten's 1992 political proposals. The image emerging from the
developments in China's Hong Kong policy is of a kind of
"guided democracy" or "neo-authoritarianism" with less tolerance
14 See Chris Yeung, Jiang Gives No Credit to Free Press and Law, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 7, 1996, at 6.
" See Jasper Becker, Living Under a Colonial Cloud, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 10, 1996 (Agenda), at 2. At the same time, contrary to its
international obligations under the Joint Declaration, China has sought to
emphasize that Hong Kong will be its internal affair totally. See Jasper Becker,
Don't Pressure Us, Christopher Told, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 21, 1996,
at 9.
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for dissent and media criticism. Contextual factors signal the two
likely components of this vision to include: (1) a values compo-
nent evident in persistent Chinese arguments about Asian values
and patriotism; and (2) an economic component evident in the
above policy pronouncements, China's own single-track economic
reform policies, and a generally favorable view of authoritarian
Asia's economic development strategies. The Asian values
argument and the Asian economic miracle developmental model,
rather than being ends in themselves, are being advanced in an
attempt to achieve legitimacy in a context where increasing
control and appointed legislators are displacing recent openness
and democratically elected legislators.86 The subsections that
follow briefly present the likely content of China's emerging
model and its theoretical weaknesses.
4.2. Asian Values
The claims regarding Asian values and human rights have been
often discussed in official and academic circles in East Asia. This
Section will only highlight and critique what these claims might
mean in the present context."' In the Hong Kong context, the
Asian values argument generally advances two concerns: (1) an
essentially negative claim that the society lacks certain cultural
prerequisites for democratization; and (2) a claim that existing
"Asian values" represent a positive alternative to the values
associated with Western liberal democracy. The first of these
claims is usually advanced by political culture theorists. The
second is more often part of an official polemic to resist forces for
democratization.
The cultural prerequisites argument is now largely discredited
in the Hong Kong case (and is therefore only briefly addressed
here) because a substantial degree of democratization has already
been achieved. Rooted in earlier arguments about republican
government, this argument is most recently associated with a
generation of scholars, beginning in the 1950s, who took up the
86 This problem of legitimacy is set to become even more complex if the
promised elections are later introduced for the legislature but not for the Chief
Executive. An appointed Chief Executive would then be confronted with an
even greater need to legitimize his executive-led government in the face of
direct legislative challenge.
8 For a more expanded and general critique of the Asian values argument,
see Davis, Democracy, Rights and Relativism, supra note 6.
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task of identifying and measuring the political culture characteris-
tics thought to be conducive to democratization." While some
of the early euphoria about the potential of this research project
has worn out, empirical research on civic culture has produced
valuable evidence charting social evolution in the context of
democratization. Hong Kong has been the subject of similar
empirical work." The prerequisites argument has, however,
suffered criticism due to its tautological character." How could
a society without democratic institutions possibly develop a
democratic culture? But as democracy actually developed in many
countries, attention within the field of culture inquiry shifted to
the question of democratic consolidation and to the study of
institutions as vehicles of change.91 What seems apparent in the
case of Hong Kong is that democratic institutions are largely in
place, including the constitutional underpinnings for a free press
and elections, political parties, substantial educational support, and
electoral experience, as well as favorable economic factors. On
this line of reasoning, any argument that the democratization
genie needs to be put back in the bottle is not credible.
The second argument, advancing a positive Asian values claim
favoring authoritarianism as an alternative, is equally lacking in
credibility in the Hong Kong context. Essentially, the Asian
values argument in relation to politics embodies the contention
that Asian cultures, Confucian culture in particular, are undemo-
cratic or positively anti-democratic and that alternative Asian
88 See, e.g., GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CiIC CULTURE
1963); ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY, PARTICIPATION, AND OPPOSiTION
1971).
'9 While social surveys have been the subject of almost daily media
attention through the transition period, there have been academic efforts as
well. See SIu-KAI LAu & HSIN-CHI KUAN, THE ETHOS OF THE HONG KONG
CHINESE (1988); Hsin-chi Kuan & Siu-kai Lau, The Partial Vision of Democracy
in[onj Kong: A Survey of Popular Opinion, 34 CHINA J. 239, 239-264 (1995).
While Kuan and Lau argue a degree of ambivalence in Hong Kong regarding
democratization, their interpretation may understate the intimidatory eftect of
China in the Hong Kong democratic equation. See Jane Lee, Transition to
Communist Rule: The Limits of the Democratic Movement in Hong Kong 1984-
1990, 17 POL., ADMIN. & CHANGE 1, 1-23 (1991).
9' See, e.g., Carol Pateman, The Civic Culture: A Philosophical Critique, in
THE CIVIC CULTURE REVISITED 67 (Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba eds.,
1980).
91 See Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 7 J.
DEMOCRACY 14 (1996).
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forms of authoritarian governance are more suitable to Asian soil.
Confucian society, according to Samuel Huntington, is said to
advance the group over the individual, authority over liberty,
responsibility over rights, and values such as harmony, coopera-
tion, order, and respect for hierarchy.2 This claim is evident in
the mainland official position that Hong Kong not be a political
city but, as noted above, has been more directly put forth by the
Chief Executive designate, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, who urges that
the people of Hong Kong think not of rights, but of duties. At
the same time, he frets about foreign forces seeking to undermine
China in Hong Kong, and about an excessively confrontational
attitude toward China. His alternative of less confrontation is
associated with Chinese culture. The Senior Minister of Singa-
pore, Lee Kuan Yew, has added fuel to the fire by pointing out
that only Hong Kong is the right size to make use of the
"Singapore model," though he has diplomatically suggested that
Singapore might follow Hong Kong when it comes to
entrepreneurship."
The problem with this positive Asian values argument on a
general level is that the evidence to date does not bare out its
claims. The most serious challenge has been the successful
development of democracy in several Chinese or historically
Confucian societies, including Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and
Hong Kong. Classical Chinese scholars and political theorists
have also challenged the claim associating modern Asian authori-
tarianism with Confucianism. 4 Even if one associates authoritar-
ian characteristics with so-called neo-Confucianism, it is difficult
to find a current authoritarian Asian regime that can claim such
lineage. Francis Fukuyama argues that the political Confucianism
of the type described by Huntington was characteristic of pre-
92 See Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy's Third Wave, in THE GLOBAL
RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 3 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Platner eds.,
1993).
93 See Richard Vines, Lee Tempers His Roar, Enter the Singapore Model, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 27, 1993, at 12.
9' See Gangjian Du & Gang Song, Relating Human Rights to Chinese
Culture: The Four Paths of the Confucian Analects and the Four Principles of a
New Theory of Benevolence, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra
note 29, at 35; Wejen Chang, The Individual and the Authorities in Traditional
Chinese Legal Thought (Feb. 24, 1995) (unpublished manuscript presented for
the Constitutionalism and China Workshop, on file with Columbia Universi-
ty).
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democratic Japan and is now discredited." The impetus for the
extreme contemporary practices of North Korea, China, and
Vietnam is more likely Karl Marx than Confucius. It is interest-
ing that when Singapore wanted to promote Confucian political
values (as distinguished from moral values), the government had
to import eight Confucian scholars to teach the rudiments. 6 In
regard to these Asian values arguments, Beng-Huat Chua criticizes
Asian intellectuals and policy makers for adopting the discourse
of "orientalism," which originally aimed to suppress them, as a
self-defining discourse.97
More significantly, none of this seems to fit contemporary
Hong Kong. Order and harmony are not the first things that
come to mind on the streets of Hong Kong. The democratic and
even confrontational values of a sizeable proportion of the Hong
Kong electorate have been borne out by their consistent electoral
choice to support the more confrontational Democratic Party.
The danger is that a regime seeking to impose pervasive restraints
on political democracy and liberty will seek moral authority in
alleged traditional political values that, in fact, have to be
imported and imposed. One would expect that this will initially
be articulated benignly through a greater emphasis on patriotism,
coupled with a bit of civic virtue. As noted above, such claims
are already being advanced. But in the long run, in the face of
resistance to the diminution of rights and democracy, one would
expect China's chosen Hong Kong leaders to employ a more
affirmative model.
As suggested by Senior Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew,
the most obvious presently available model will likely be the kind
of neo-conservative so-called communitarianism practiced in
Singapore. In Singapore, some notion of collective well-being is
used to justify state intervention in all spheres of social life, under
a legal regime that subordinates individual rights and inhibits
public discourse.98 China, likewise, employs a collective concep-
tion of human rights, rooted in Marxism, which seeks to subordi-
s See Francis Fukuyama, Confucianism and Democracy, 6 J. DEMOCRACY
20 (1995).
96 See BENG-HUAT CHUA, COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRA-
CY IN SINGAPORE 159 (1995).
97 See id. at 147.
98 See id. at 187.
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nate the rights of the individual to that of the collective state."
The strange twist of China extending this conceptualization to its
capitalist S.A.R. may be that we will have an officially Marxist
regime promoting Confucianism under an ostensibly Singaporean
model. To do this, the free spirited Hong Kong society would
have to be suppressed, and the sense of personal well-being
associated with freedom and the rule of law would be seriously
undermined. With this development might go the loss of the
entrepreneurial spirit that fuels Hong Kong's economy, which Lee
Kuan Yew so admires.
4.3. The Asian Economic Miracle
The notion of an economic Hong Kong that seems to animate
the current rhetoric of Chinese leaders appears to take its spirit
from the economic models said to be responsible for the Asian
economic miracle. The paradox is that these models are being
promoted after Hong Kong's economic miracle has occurred
(without use of the developmental policy usually associated with
this Asian model) and at the stage where the other most successful
Asian newly industrialized countries ("NICs") have moved on to
institute democratic reform. The grand model is Japan. There are
variations on the Japanese theme used to justify harsher authori-
tarianism because Japan is a democracy. It must be borne in mind
that given Hong Kong's already highly developed economy, the
burden is on those who want to impose a substantially different
economic model to justify the validity of such an approach.
Therefore, it is not necessary to rehash all of the contextual
nuances of the Asian economic development argument to justify
a degree of skepticism about this alternative paradigm. The
advancement of the Hong Kong model appears to involve a kind
of "guided democracy" in which Beijing controls the results along
with Hong Kong's historic free-wheeling capitalism. This should
be contrasted with the guided capitalist planning usually credited
to the other Asian NICs - a model from which such NICS
increasingly are moving away.
The Asian miracle has usually been characterized by a
9' This is most prominently articulated in Article 51 of the P.R.C.
Constitution and is more fully developed in a recent White Paper. See
INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, HumAN RIGHTS IN CHINA
(1991).
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combination of export-led growth ("ELG") and a domestic
developmental economic model. The ELG that is common in
Asia is usually contrasted with a more protectionist import
substitution industrialization ("ISI") model especially common in
Latin America.' °  ELG emphasizes production for outside
markets rather than the ISI strategy of producing local products
to displace those historically supplied by outsiders. As noted
above, Hong Kong has historically shared the ELG component
but has had little interest in the concurrent domestic developmen-
tal economic model. 1' While colonial bureaucratic policy
makers have been autonomous, they have not been engaged in the
micro-level industrial planning that this model usually entails.
The developmental economic model, which is said to justify
authoritarian government, has been characterized by such terms
as "governed market," "market-preserving authoritarianism," "plan
rationality," and the "developmental state."102 In its various
forms, it usually involves a tripartite framework of a highly
autonomous technocratic bureaucracy, a politically authoritarian
regime or ruling party, and a connected or compliant business
elite.'03  The relationship between the bureaucracy and the
business sector is also characterized by a degree of embeddedness,
what Peter Evans calls embedded autonomy.' 4 The bureaucrat-
ic elite provides business a high degree of planning or guidance
within the context of the capitalist market to insure the specific
kinds of industrial developments that have been targeted, based on
10 See STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE
PoLIrIcs OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 1-22
(1990).
101 See id. at 25-27.
102 See CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRAcLE: THE
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 17-23 (1982); ROBERT WADE,
GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERN-
MENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 26-29 (1990); Shuhe Li & Peng
Lian, On Market-Preserving Authoritarianism - An Institutional Analysis of
Growth Miracles (May 8, 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Chinese University of Hong Kong).
103 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 50; Chalmers Johnson, Political
Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 136-64 (Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987); Li & Lian, supra
note 102, at 19.
104 See PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY, STATES AND INDUSTRIAL
TRANSFORMATION 12 (1995).
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anticipated competitiveness in the targeted outside market.0 5
Special government agencies staffed by the most elite and best
trained bureaucrats may be charged with major planning responsi-
bility (for example, MITI in Japan). This system embodies an
industrial policy which offers economic incentives (for example,
loan guarantees, monopoly privileges, land use, and subsidies) at
the micro-level, rather than relying solely on general economic
regulation and infrastructural support.1°6  Developing and
implementing such micro-level guidance may entail an encompass-
ing coalition of business and government elites. 07
The authoritarian regime is relied upon to deal with crisis,
maintain political stability, and repress particularistic distributional
claims that may interfere with the economic development
plan.0 ' The political side of this equation may include the usual
range of authoritarian techniques employed around the world,
including, for example, repression of opposition groups and the
press, declarations of states of emergency, corporatist control of
interest groups, formal and informal political pacts, co-optation
via patronage, emasculation of legislative bodies, and rule by
decree. 1°9 The Japanese post-war "soft authoritarian" model
described by Chalmers Johnson evidenced none of the harsh
techniques but, under a democratic framework, employed a
tripartite coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party, the bureaucra-
cy, and the business elite, along with various pacts, co-optation,
and technocratic guidance.10 Prior to democratization, Korea
and Taiwan employed nearly all of the above harsh and soft tech-
niques.1 Singapore historically has emphasized the corporatist
methods of pacts and co-optation, along with selected harsher
105 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 22-23; Johnson, supra note 103, at
136-64; Li & Lian, supra note 102, at 19.
106 See WADE, supra note 102, at 26-29; Johnson, supra note 103, at 136-64.
107 See Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM.
POL. SCL REV. 567, 567 (1993).
o See HAGGARD, supra note 100, at 259-62.
109 See Thomas M. Callaghy, Political Passions and Economic Interest"
Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa, in HEMMED IN: RESPONSES
TO AFRICA'S ECONOMiC DECLINE 473 (Thomas M. Callaghy & John Ravenhill
eds., 1993).
110 See JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 50-5 1.
... See Johnson, supra note 103, at 136-64; see also HAGGARD, supra note
100, at 51-100, 130-46.
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methods, used especially to control opposition and the press.'
By contrast, Hong Kong, with a system that is usually
characterized as non-interventionist or laissez-faire, has historically
had an authoritarian, colonial regime with little government
intervention on the economic front and a high degree of political
and personal freedom."' Hong Kong historically shared two
main characteristics with the other Asian NICs: reliance on ELG,
and an autonomous bureaucracy under an authoritarian-colonial
government. 114  As discussed above, however, the autonomous
Hong Kong bureaucracy focused its attention on infrastructure
and macro-level developmental support, in lieu of the micro-level
industrial incentives that generally characterize the East Asian
model."' There has been neither government industrial plan-
ning nor government financing. There has been macro-level
support for setting technical design standards and allocating land
for industrial development and infrastructure development;
supporting labor (in the form of cheap public housing and medical
services); and maintaining a reliable legal environment for
business, including vigorous corruption control and a free
press.1 6  It is the latter elements that are most threatened by
emerging transition developments, and at which both the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law are ostensibly targeted.
Unfortunately, some of the milder co-opting techniques have
already been introduced into Hong Kong's emerging China-related
politics, with select business elite being appointed to Chinese
advisory and political bodies in exchange for their loyalty. One
may also expect rewards from the huge China business interest for
compliant press organizations, resulting in self-censorship.
117 Of
course, as noted above, Chinese officials have been promising
1 See HAGGARD, supra note 100, at 100-26, 146-50.
1 See id. at 100-26, 150-57; CHIU, supra note 34; Mee-Kau Nyaw, The
Experiences of Industrial Growth in Hong Kong and Singapore: A Comparative
Study, in INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG 185-222
(Edward K.Y. Chen et al. eds., 1991).
114 See HAGGARD, supra note 100, at 116.
11 See id. at 122; CHIU, supra note 34, at 8.
116 See generally CHIU, supra note 34.
117 There already have been rumors of mainland Chinese banks publishing
a media black list of newspapers in which banks should not advertise. See
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE, REVIEW OF THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, 1993 394 (1994).
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harsher controls of the press and political groups, presumably to
be implemented under the promised future subversion and
sedition laws, to be passed by their appointed S.A.R. Provisional
Legislature and Chief Executive. Since there is little economic
incentive for this controlling and overbearing behavior, it may
ultimately prove to be the shell of authoritarianism without the
substance of an economic development strategy.
4.4. The Weaknesses of the Authoritarian Economic Model
There are several levels of challenge to this authoritarian
economic model, both general and specific. On a general level,
offering authoritarianism to a society that is already economically
developed and substantially liberalized risks creating increased
political conflict. In relating industrialization to democracy,
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D.
Stephens argue that the relationship is not merely one of the
concurrence of the free markets of goods and ideas, but rather that
industrialization transforms society in a way that empowers
subordinate classes and makes it difficult to exclude them
politically.' Hong Kong has both highly educated productive
classes in a service-oriented economy and a diverse formally
empowered civil society. Where such classes are both economical-
ly and formally empowered, attempting to put the genie back in
the bottle seems certain to invite dissatisfaction and confrontation.
It is true, as many scholars predict," 9 that the business elite in
Hong Kong have generally tried to exclude the subordinate classes
from the political process and seem intent on supporting China's
post-1997 model, which seeks to renew the same tradition.
Whether or not democracy is difficult at the early stages of
economic development is a debatable proposition, but there is no
credible evidence that authoritarianism will improve the prospects
for further development at a more advanced stage. 2 ' While
acknowledging that a good dictator is better than anarchy, Mancur
118 See DIETRICH RUESCHMEYER ET AL., CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMOCRACY vii (1992).
119 See id. at 8; HAGGARD, supra note 100, at 260.
120 See Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure? 7 J.
DEMOCRAcY 39 (1996); Robert H. Bates & Anne 0. Krueger, Generalizations
A risingfrom the Country Studies, in POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS
IN ECONoMIc REFORM PoLIcY: EVIDENCE FROM EIGHT COUNTRIES 444-72
(Robert H. Bates & Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1993).
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Olson argues that such a system is relatively unstable beyond one
or two such leaders.121 Olson asserts that the same conditions
necessary for maximum economic development - human rights,
freedom of speech, and the rule of law - are necessary for
democracy.
The fact that nearly all of the former economically successful
authoritarian regimes in Asia have now gone through democratic
reform tends to bare out the attraction of these elements. Many
who have lauded the specific achievements of the authoritarian
models employed elsewhere in Asia have emphasized that, in each
case, these systems had evolved slowly over years of trial and
error specifically responsive to the particular institutional
conditions of the country under discussion; and they now also
laud reform.122 All of the Asian NICs except Singapore have
since embarked on a policy of political reform and opening up
their formerly protected economies to global forces. In order to
achieve orderly and open processes of interest representation in
complex developed societies, such reform seems essential. In the
absence of reform, the inevitable particularistic claims generated
in highly developed countries will achieve expression only
through corruption and back-room dealing 1 2'
Specifically, the most striking objection is that Hong Kong has
never relied on the developmental state model. As noted above,
commentators have almost uniformly characterized the Hong
Kong economic development model as laissez-faire or non-
interventionist. 24  For Hong Kong to start copying these
authoritarian models would be a big step backwards. This talk of
an economic rather than a political city aims at rationalizing
authoritarian political practices, with all the attendant risks of
corruption and influence peddling, and without the economic
developmental benefits which usually are said to justify such
practices. Historically, the key elements under Hong Kong's non-
interventionist model have been vigorous competitiveness and
121 See Olson, supra note 107, at 572.
122 See, e.g., HAGGARD, supra note 100, at 158; Peter Evans, The State as
Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change,
in THE PoLiTics OF EcoNOMIC ADjUsTmENT 139, 165 (Stephan Haggard &
Robert R. Kaufman eds., 1992).
12 See Evans, supra note 122, at 139, 165, 179.
124 See CHiU, supra note 34, at 1; HAGGARD, supra note 100, at 101; Nyaw,
supra note 113, at 203.
[Vol. 18:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/10
POLITICS VERSUS ECONOMICS
high levels of entrepreneurship. The latter aspect has been the
envy of the world, with even Senior Minister of Singapore Lee
Kuan Yew lauding Hong Kong's superiority in this regard.1"
Mainland official suggestions to sanitize local political discourse
through censorship and orthodoxy may operate to deprive Hong
Kong of essential vitality. These suggestions should be reexam-
ined.
It is important, at this transition stage, to take a serious look
at the type of community that is evolving in Hong Kong and to
get ahead of, rather than behind, the curve. Beyond its historical
laurels, we must consider Hong Kong's role in the twenty-first
century, the period to which the transition is directed. In this
regard, Yue-man Yeung and Fu-chen Lo have characterized Hong
Kong as an emerging world city.126 By this term, they are
describing a city that goes beyond the megalopolis, a city which
ties a region to the global economy. Such a city may have a
global role in bringing information and financing to an entire
region and beyond. Such a city relies on a highly educated
population with access to the latest information and requires
reliable support systems, especially the rule of law. Individual
dignity and freedom must be respected, so that individuals and the
organizations they serve will fully realize the vast potential
afforded by these emerging circumstances.IV There seems little
room at the helm of such a city for a controlling authoritarian
regime. Singapore will have to confront problems of this nature
as it enters the twenty-first century. There is no reason for Hong
Kong to take up this cross. Under such circumstances, the luster
would soon be lost. The Joint Declaration appears to recognize
this imperative. We can only hope that such vision has not been
lost.
5. CONCLUSION
The Joint Declaration promised Hong Kong the road to a
vibrant and free twenty-first century. This was to be sustained
under a democratic system with human rights and the rule of law.
125 See Vines, supra note 93, at 12.
126 See Yue-man Yeung & Fu-chen Lo, Global Restructuring and Emerging
Urban Corridors in Pacific Asia, in EMERGING WORLD CITIES IN PACIFIC ASIA
17, 1747 (Fu-chen Lo & Yue-man Yeung eds., 1996).
1" See Olson, supra note 107, at 572.
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In the waning days of British rule, a different vision of authoritari-
an control has become evident in China's transition policies. The
shell of an alleged Asian values and Asian economic miracle model
is being imported to justify authoritarianism (or, at best, liberal
oligarchy) in a society where mobilized subordinate classes and an
entrenched civil society have already demanded and tasted
democracy. That this is a shell is evident by the fact that the so-
called Asian economic model offers nothing to Hong Kong, a city
which clearly has achieved its success without the assistance of
such a developmental model.
The economic risks of employing this authoritarian shell are
enormous. They include loss of the system's information base,
diminution of entrepreneurial spirit, loss of the contractual
reliability and personal dignity insured by the rule of law,
emigration of creative talent, and increased corruption and
influence peddling. This is all being offered under the framework
of political architecture that promises the opposite in a society
that has had little historical reason to trust the new regime. That
an ostensibly Marxist regime is turning Hong Kong over to a
bourgeois elite is an apparent paradox if one discounts the fact
that this elite has proven most amenable to the emerging policies.
In Marxist lexicon, as recent mainland media propaganda suggests,
this may enable the central government to portray Hong Kong as
less, rather than more, privileged in comparison to the mainland.
All of this is being done in a society in which subordinate
classes and civil society in general have just begun to taste the
benefits of their economic success and of limited democracy and
freedom. Unless these policies are moderated and the promise of
the Joint Declaration is restored, this appears to be a recipe for
increased confrontation and ultimate repression. By sponsoring
an unpopular leftist and business elite, the central government
risks driving more support into the democratic camp, which it has
isolated historically. This creates a volatile situation that under-
mines the authority of Hong Kong's anointed political leaders.
The confrontation between the business elite, who have sought to
limit the participatory rights of the masses, and pro-democracy
forces has already been evident, as has been the tensions between
other pro-China leftist forces and the democrats. When the full
weight of official power is brought into this equation, the likely
disaster is evident. All of this is being done in an era when the
other newly developed countries of the region have already
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completed policies of democratization. In this context, such harsh
policies could have both national and regional implications.
As a global financial center, Hong Kong relies on precisely the
opposite conditions for its success and survival. Hong Kong's
economic success has relied on neither the tripartite framework
(of party, bureaucracy; and business) and micro-incentive based
industrial policy of Japan, nor the hard authoritarian industrial
policy of South Korea and Taiwan, nor the authoritarian
corporatist industrial policy of Singapore. Its non-interventionist
policies had long been supported by influential business elites in
leading British conglomerates and banks. Recent democratic
reforms have reduced the influence wielded by such elites under
previous colonial practices. To reintroduce rule by business elites
at a time when the rule of law and freedom, as checks on the
system, are already under threat may (especially in the face of
China's own problems with corruption) produce the unintended
consequences of corruption and influence peddling. At the same
time, it must be remembered that, like Hong Kong, the successes
of the other Asian NICs were produced under unique historical
circumstances. Their historical authoritarian policies have no
practical application in Hong Kong. Under such circumstances,
to introduce the rhetoric of "Asian values and economics" is a
poorly disguised attempt to assert political control, and to
introduce the costs of authoritarianism without the alleged
benefits.
China's reliance on Hong Kong's success makes a more
prudent policy even more imperative. Throughout the long years
of the Cold War and the Cultural Revolution, leaders in Beijing
had the wisdom to stay out of Hong Kong's affairs. For China
to attempt to control Hong Kong's political leadership, censor
political discourse, and offer orthodox interpretations of political
events, hardly seems calculated to foster the type of global vibrant
city that Hong Kong has become. We can only hope that
historical prudence with respect to Hong Kong will be rediscov-
ered.
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